Hans Hoppe, maahanmuutto ja ulkoisvaikutukset

Olen aiemmin väittänyt, että maahanmuuttoon voi liittyä yhteismaan ongelma. Työnantajan etu on hankkia halpaa työvoimaa ulkomailta, mutta mahdollinen haitta maahanmuutosta sitä kautta että tiettyjen maahanmuuttajaryhmien toinen sukupolvi ei sopeudu yhteiskuntaan vaan ajautuu vaikkapa rikollisuuteen tai yhteiskunnan elätiksi, voi tehdä maahanmuutosta yhteismaan ongelman. Sama vaikutus syntyy jos maahanmuuttajiksi valitaan jostain syystä väkeä, jonka biologiset tai kulttuuriset ominaisuudet ovat heikkoja.

Libertaari taloustieteilijä, Nevadan yliopiston taloustieteen professori Hans Hoppe, jota Ellilän Mikko lainaa ajattelee faktisesti samoin:

Against many left-libertarian open border enthusiasts, it is incorrect to infer from the fact that an immigrant has found someone willing to employ him that his presence on a given territory must henceforth be considered “invited.” Strictly speaking, this conclusion is true only if the employer also assumes the full costs associated with the importation of his immigrant-employee.

This is the case under the much-maligned arrangement of a “factory town” owned and operated by a proprietor. Here, the full cost of employment, the cost of housing, healthcare, and all other amenities associated with the immigrant’s presence, is paid for by the proprietor. No one else’s property is involved in the immigrant-worker settlement.

Pienimuotoisia "Factory town"eja on ollut aikaisemmin Suomessakin. Mm. Ahlström-osakeyhtiö loi ruukki-yhdyskuntia, joissa yhtiö omisti kaikki kiinteistöt ja huolehti myös suuresta osasta sosiaalikustannuksista. Kauttua, Sunila, Fiskars, Verla, Mustio (joka oli lyhyen aikaa oma tosin laiton kunta), ...

Less perfectly (and increasingly less so), this full-cost-principle of immigration is realized in Swiss immigration policy. In Switzerland immigration matters are decided on the local rather than federal government level, by the local owner-resident community in which the immigrant wants to reside. These owners are interested that the immigrant’s presence in their community increase rather than decrease their property values. In places as attractive as Switzerland, this typically means that the immigrant (or his employer) is expected to buy his way into a community, which often requires multimillion dollar donations.

Unfortunately, welfare states are not operated like factory towns or even Swiss communities. Under welfare-statist condition the immigrant employer must pay only a small fraction of the full costs associated with the immigrant’s presence. He is permitted to socialize (externalize) a substantial part of such costs onto other property owners.

Equipped with a work permit, the immigrant is allowed to make free use of every public facility: roads, parks, hospitals, schools, and no landlord, businessman, or private associated is permitted to discriminate against him as regards housing, employment, accommodation, and association. That is, the immigrant comes invited with a substantial fringe benefits package paid for not (or only partially) by the immigrant employer (who allegedly has extended the invitation), but by other domestic proprietors as taxpayers who had no say in the invitation whatsoever. This is not an “invitation,” as commonly understood. This is an imposition. It is like inviting immigrant workers to renovate one’s own house while feeding them from other people’s refrigerators.

Consequently, because the cost of importing immigrant workers is lowered, more employer-sponsored immigrants will arrive than otherwise. Moreover, the character of the immigrant changes, too. While Swiss communities choose well-heeled, highly value-productive immigrants, whose presence enhances communal property values all-around, employers under democratic welfare State conditions are permitted by state law to externalize their employment costs on others and tend to import increasingly cheap, low-skilled and low value-productive immigrants, regardless of their effect on all-around communal property values.